The integration of Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) (to describe intrusions) and Colored Petri Nets (CPNs) (to specify design) is examined for an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The IDS under development is a collection of mobile agents that detect, classify, and correlate system and network activities. Software Fault Trees (SFTs), augmented with nodes that describe trust, temporal, and contextual relationships, are used to describe intrusions.
Introduction
A secure computer system provides guarantees regarding the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its objects (such as data, processes, or services). However, systems generally contain design and implementation flaws that result in security vulnerabilities. An intrusion takes place when an attacker or group of attackers exploit security vulnerabilities and thus violate the confidentiality, integrity, or availability guarantees of a system. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) detect some set of intrusions and execute some predetermined action when an intrusion is detected.
Intrusion detection systems use audit information obtained from host systems and networks to determine whether violations of a system's security policy are occurring or have occurred [3] . Our Multi-Agents Intrusion Detection System (MAIDS) [15, 14] uses mobile agents [4] in a distributed system to obtain audit data, correlate events, and discover intrusions. The MAIDS system comprises (1) stationary data cleaning agents that obtain information from system logs, audit data, and operational statistics and convert the information into a common format, (2) low level agents that monitor and classify ongoing activities, classify events, and pass on their information to mediators, and (3) data mining [6] agents that use machine learning to acquire predictive rules for intrusion detection from system logs and audit data.
However, we find the lack of a sound theoretical model and systematic method for the construction to be an impediment to development of the system. One of the challenges in designing an IDS involves defining exactly what data elements should be correlated to determine whether an intrusion is taking place on a distributed system. It is also difficult to determine what data was necessary to discover intrusions. Verification of the proper operation of the IDS was possible only informally by executing the IDS and checking its results. A model of intrusion detection is necessary to describe how the data should flow through the system, determine whether the system would be able to detect intrusions, and suggest points at which countermeasures could be implemented.
An end-to-end software model, covering the requirements specification, design, and implementation of the IDS, satisfies the need for a systematic modeling and method for constructing the IDS. We use Software Fault Trees to analyze intrusions and develop the requirements model for the IDS. The SFTA models of intrusions are used to create Colored Petri Net (CPN) designs for the detectors in the IDS. The CPN detector models are then mapped into the implementation as mobile agents that form the distributed intrusion detection system. Finally, the SFTA models provide test cases for the implementation.
The SFTA approach applies safety engineering techniques to the intrusion detection domain for developing IDS requirements. Similarly, the CPN model for an intrusion detection system provides a way to develop an IDS design.
The software mobile agent intrusion detection architecture enables development of an efficient, distributed intrusion detection system. However, each part of the development process -SFTA, CPNs, and software agent implementation -is distinct, and we want to ensure that each stage in the development process correctly carries over the details of the previous stages. An algorithmic transformation is useful to convert requirements into design templates and design into implementation templates. The constructive approach helps ensure the correctness of the design with respect to requirements and correctness of the implementation with respect to the design.
We present the process for developing a CPN design for the IDS using a requirements specification based on a SFTA of intrusions, and we show the procedure for creating an implementation of a distributed agent-based IDS from the CPN design. These two procedures ensure that the design satisfies the requirements and that the implementation matches the design.
This section has introduced the problem and our approach to solving it. The rest of the paper follows this structure: Section 2 introduces temporal organization of stages of intrusions and presents the intrusions examined in our research.
Section 3 discusses Software Fault Trees as applied to modeling intrusions and the augmentations we needed to sufficiently describe intrusions for later stages of the development process. Section 4 introduces CPNs and defines the translation from SFTA to CPNs. Section 5 defines the translation of CPNs to code. Section 6 relates our modeling solution to other graph-based intrusion detection models.
Section 7 presents the conclusions and contributions of this work, discusses the generalization of the IDS design to intrusions other than those presented in this paper, and describes future work.
Intrusions Detected
Intrusions are divided into temporal components for the purposes of our analysis and development of the IDS. Then, we discuss the intrusions used in this paper.
Temporal Stages of Intrusions
Each successful intrusion can vary greatly from other intrusions, and analysis of complete intrusions is difficult. A reasonable approach is to divide intrusions into stages of attacks that achieve intermediate goals of the attacker and develop intrusion detection components that identify each of the stages. Ruiu's analysis of intrusions [37] divides intrusions into seven stages: Reconnaissance, Vulnerability Identification, Penetration, Control, Embedding, Data Extraction & Modification, and Attack Relay.
We use Ruiu's stages to structure the analysis of the intrusions discussed in this paper. We use the stages to break down intrusions and reduce the complexity of each SFTA. The CPNs examined in this paper generally correspond to the reconnaissance, vulnerability identification, and penetration phases of intrusions, as these first three stages are essential to intrusions.
Descriptions of Examined Intrusions
We focus on two motivating examples of intrusions to demonstrate our IDS development technique. These examples were chosen based on availablility of attack information and the possibility that more than one host in the victim's network would be involved in the attack.
One type of intrusion we consider in detail is an FTP bounce attack. The "FTP Host" provides an anonymous FTP service that allows uploads and the "Target Host" provides a remote shell service that trusts the users on the "FTP Host."
1. In preparation, the attacker creates a file containing a valid remote shell (rsh) message such as \0root\0root\0xterm -display bad.hacker.org:0.0 which means "I am the user root on the local computer, I wish to execute a command on the remote computer as the user root, and the command I wish to execute will open a terminal window from the remote computer on my screen." 2. The attacker scans for valid hosts in the target's network. For the purposes of our spatially distributed attack, assume the attacker discovers at least two host systems in the target's networks. (Reconnaissance) 3. The attacker scans for listening TCP ports on the target network's valid hosts. Assume the attacker discovers a vulnerable anonymous FTP server listening at TCP port 21 on the "FTP Host", and a remote shell daemon (rshd) listening at port 514 on the "Target Host." (Vulnerability Identification) 4. The attacker uploads the previously created file to the anonymous FTP server on the "FTP Host".
5. The attacker uses a "feature" of the FTP protocol to tell the FTP server to send the next download to port 514 on the "Target Host". Then the attacker issues a command to the FTP server that initiates a "download" of the file containing the rsh message. If the "Target Host" trusts the users on the "FTP Host", the remote shell daemon on the "Target Host" accepts the message and executes it due to an authentication vulnerability in the remote shell 
Software Fault Trees
Software Fault Tree Analysis is briefly introduced and its use in the IDS development process is specified. Then, useful additions to SFTA for diagramming intrusions are discussed.
Fault-tree structures have been used previously for security assessment, although not explicitly for IDS. Cited advantages include their "organization and preservation of informal discussions about security ramifications of design alternatives" (in argument trees [23] ) and the possibility for efficient reuse of subtrees (in attack trees [40] ). Fault trees have been criticized because of their limitations in modeling "multiple attacker attempts, time dependencies, or access controls" as well as for not modeling cycles [33] . The augmented fault trees developed here address those limitations while preserving the advantages of SFTA for security assessments.
Two interesting aspects of the requirements phase of this prototype are as follows. First, the intrusion SFTA models have been interpreted as specifications of the combinations of events that must be detected. That is, the IDS requirements are that each of the intrusion sequences possible in the SFTA should be detected as soon (low in the tree) as possible. The leaf events describe what components of a distributed system must be monitored by the mobile agent software. The interpretation of the SFTA serves as the requirements specification.
Second, the intrusion SFTA have had to be extended with additional information specific to a particular system prior to their mapping into CPNs. This information is of three types: Trust (which members of a distributed system are trusted by other members); Context (which events must all involve the same host(s) or connection(s), process(es) or session(s)); and Temporal orderings (e.g., which events must be adjacent with no intervening events, or follow within a specific interval of time). Without this additional system-specific information, the IDS yields many false positives, detecting intrusions where, in a specific network, there is none. That is, the set of events marked as intrusions by the SFTA is a superset of the set of events that are actually intrusions in any specific network and must be constrained by additional network-specific knowledge. These topics are discussed in more detail below.
Software Fault Tree Analysis
Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) [28] is used first to model intrusions and develop requirements for the IDS.
SFTA is a natural fit as the IDS design resembles a tree where data is obtained at the leaf nodes, travels up through the internal nodes as data is correlated with other information, and rises to the root node when an intrusion is identified.
A fault tree is a tree consisting of: a hazard as the tree's root node, basic events that contribute to the hazard as the tree's leaves, and either AND gates or OR gates (representing Boolean AND or OR operations, respectively) as each of the intermediate nodes. The intermediate nodes determine the combination of basic events necessary for the root hazard to occur.
Software Fault Tree Analysis is an adaptation to software of the Fault Tree analysis technique, where the hazard is a software failure and the contributing events occur in the software system prior to the hazard. SFTA provides a structured backward analysis from a root node representing the hazard (here, the intrusion) being analyzed. After a hazard is specified as the root node of the tree, necessary preconditions for the hazard are specified in the next level of the tree and joined to the root with a logical AND or a logical OR. Each precondition is similarly expanded until all leaves are events that occur with some calculable probability or cannot be further analyzed. The backward analysis investigates the ways in which the hazard (root node) might feasibly occur. If a credible scenario (i.e., path through the tree or, more precisely, a cutset of the tree) exists, the SFTA assists in identifying which nodes (i.e., which events) might profitably be subjected to monitoring.
SFTA in the IDS Development Lifecycle
We do not interpret the Software Fault Trees (SFT) directly as requirements, unlike [13] . Instead, we require the IDS to detect intrusions that an SFTA describes. A straightforward approach was desired for the intrusion application because we want the fault tree to be developed and maintained by system support personnel rather than by experts in formal specification. It is primarily the support personnel's knowledge of the system and its vulnerabilities that the fault tree is intended to capture. More detail on the use of SFTA as a tool to assist generation of CPNs is available in a related paper [16] .
The SFTA models are then mapped into Colored Petri Nets (CPNs) [21] that serve as the design for the IDS.
CPNs are a well-documented and frequently-used abstraction for modeling complex and distributed systems. They appear particularly suited for describing the gathering, classification, and correlation activities of an intrusion detection system.
The advantages of using SFTA to specify the requirements, rather than using only CPNs, are fourfold.
1. Usability. The system support personnel who will be using the system typically have a great deal of knowledge about intrusions that must be elicited and represented systematically in order for the requirements for the IDS to be determined. Usually they are not experienced in, or interested in, formal modeling techniques such as CPNs. Fault trees, on the other hand, are perceived as familiar, easy to use, and easy to teach and learn. Since an IDS to be effective must be readily updatable the usability of SFTA is an advantage in eliciting and capturing knowledge about the requirements.
2.
Support for gradual refinement. SFTA supports gradual development of an intrusion profile with different subtrees being developed to varying levels of detail, depending on the level of concern and level of knowledge regarding that subtree. CPNs, on the other hand, are better at modeling a system at a uniform level of detail.
3. Modeling the attack. The SFTA directly models the intrusion. It is from this representation that the requirements for intrusion detection are derived. The CPN models not the intrusion itself but the intrusion detection, i.e., the design of the IDS.
4. Countermeasures analysis. The SFTA model of intrusions allows determination of countermeasures needed for an IDS to thwart attacks [16] .
Augmented SFTA
For this paper, we will define an augmented Software Fault Tree for the intrusion domain to be a SFTA where leaf nodes may specify trust, ordering, and contextual constraints in addition to the basic events of a SFTA. We add constraint nodes to Software Fault Trees for intrusion modeling. The added leaf nodes capture trust, order, and contextual relationships needed to develop a satisfactory model of the intrusions that have been analyzed. With the addition of constraint nodes, the design of an intrusion detection system much more closely corresponds to the requirements for the intrusion detection system specified via an SFTA. In the sections following this one, when SFTA is mentioned it is assumed to be augmented as described below.
The effect of adding constraint nodes may be demonstrated by considering the set of all combinations of events that make the root node of a plain (unenhanced) SFTA "true". The set Á of combinations of events that are actual intrusions must also make the root node of the augmented SFTA "true". ( Á ought to be much smaller than .) The constraint nodes added to an augmented SFTA should exclude the vast majority of the combinations of "false positive" events Á. Thus the augmented SFTA, enhanced with the constraint nodes described here, will more closely model the requirements for an intrusion detection system.
Trust
Members of a distributed system trust other members of the system. The only form of trust currently used in our SFTA is authorization. We expect to have to revise the trust constraint when additional intrusions are modeled that depend on other notions of trust. Also, we acknowledge that trust constraints are not transitive and thus combining multiple trust nodes is not possible.
As an example of trust, a Network File System (NFS) server using AUTH_UNIX authentication usually trusts the source IP address and user ID in client requests. This allows a user on a trusted client host to access files on the file server without having to login to the server.
Explicitly stating a trust relationship that is required for an intrusion to succeed provides information to an intrusion detection system developer that will help derive an accurate matching model for the intrusion. 
Semantics:
The ÌÖÙ×Ø× predicate is true if the destination assigns some trust to the source. Specifying trust relationships in this way allows matching relationships to be unified [39] with other trust relationships. A trust relationship is true if one of a system's trust relationships successfully unifies with the relationship specified by the Trusts predicate.
Example: Such a trust relationship may be:
ÌÖÙ×Ø×´´Ê× Ø Ö ØÀÓ×Øµ ´×ÓÙÖ ÀÓ×Øµµ which states that the remote shell daemon (Rshd) on a targetHost trusts a sourceHost. By convention, elements beginning with upper-case letters are constants, and elements beginning with lower-case letters are variables.
Context
Certain combinations of intrusive events must occur in some common context. For example, a series of FTP commands and responses need to be grouped by a common network connection to an FTP server.
In the following definitions of forms of context, each of the parameters (host, connection, user, or process) may be specified as a constant value or a variable.
a. Network
Network-related events may be related by events involving a single host, a pair of hosts, or a single virtual network connection.
a1. Single Host
A single host that must be a common source or target for network events may be specified as a common context for intrusive events.
Syntax: ÓÒØ ÜØ´´ Ó×Ø ÀÓ×ØÒ Ñ μ ÌAEÓ Ä ×Øµµ where:
Hostname: Name or address of a host or group of hosts FTNodeList: List of one or more fault tree nodes to be included in the context Semantics: The Context predicate is true when the host identified by Hostname is involved in each node specified by the FTNodeList.
Example:
The context for a single host hostname that may be the target of two simultaneous attacks (indicated by fault tree nodes Attack1 and Attack2) would be ÓÒØ ÜØ´´ Ó×Ø Ó×ØÒ Ñ μ ØØ ½ ØØ ¾µµ.
a2. Host Pair
A pair of hosts that must be the source and target for network events may be specified as a common context for intrusive events. 
a3. Network Connection
A pair of hosts communicating using a virtual network connection that must be the source and target for network events may be specified as a common context for intrusive events. 
Example:
The commands and responses involved in an FTP upload from a source host to a destination host may be set in a common context by the predicate:
b. Host
A common host-based context, such as processes or user sessions, may be necessary for intrusions.
b1. User Session
An authenticated user session on a host, such as via telnet, ssh, or ftp, may be a context for related events. User: Name of a single user or group of users Application: Name of method of access (e.g., telnet, ftp, etc.) LHost: Name of the host to which the user is connected RHost: Name of a remote host or group of hosts Terminal: Name of a terminal used for access (e.g., tty01)
LoginTime: Specification of time of login
FTNodeList: List of one or more fault tree nodes to be included in the context Semantics: A user session is established using the Application into the LHost from the RHost to the Terminal beginning at time LoginTime. The context involves each node specified by the FTNodeList.
Example:
The nodes corresponding to the use of the ps, who, and logout command executed by a user during a login session on the host durango from host nova via telnet may be set in a common Example: If a process opens and writes the system password file, a common context for these events may be:
Temporal Ordering and Intervals
Events and conditions involved in an intrusion often must occur in a particular order. Explicitly specifying the event ordering excludes other non-intrusive permutations of events from being considered as intrusive. We use Allen and
Ferguson's interval temporal logic [2] to develop predicates.
a. Occurs After
An event which takes place must make its node in the fault tree true as long as the existence of that event may be combined with other events to make a parent node true. It seems an event's period may last as long as the context exists in which it may be evaluated. In this sense, "occurs after" is concerned only with the relative start of event's periods.
"Occurs after" is the condition where one event's period is required to start after another event's period has started. The ËØ ÖØ×´ µ primitive is true when periods and begin simultaneously. The Å Ø × µ primitive is true when period ends adjacent to the time where period begins. Let È Ö Ó ´Üµ be the period that node Ü is true. Let: Example: In an FTP session, a command must be followed by a response before a second command is issued.
Such a constraint may be specified by the predicate:
An event may be required to follow another event within some amount of time. Let ËØ ÖØÇ ´ µ be the start of discrete time period . The ÇÚ ÖÐ Ô×´ µ primitive is true when period overlaps period . Example: A TCP SYN (connection request) packet must be followed by a SYN/ACK packet (connection accepted) within 75 seconds for the connection to continue. A constraint that models this requirement could be:
Colored Petri Nets
This section introduces and defines Colored Petri Nets, then describes the transformation from SFTA for intrusions to CPN templates for intrusion detection.
Colored Petri Nets Defined
CPNs are a powerful modeling technique for complex systems [21] . CPNs combine state and action into a single diagram through the use of tokens of various colors (colors can be thought of as data types) which reside in places (or states). Tokens move from one place to another through transitions. Transitions allow tokens to pass if all input arcs are enabled (meaning tokens are available for each input arc). Tokens entering from multiple places may be merged (or unified) at transitions. Tokens leaving transitions may be duplicated to multiple destination places. CPNs may be organized in hierarchical fashion to allow reuse and top-down or bottom-up development, as is possible in modern programming languages.
In a graphical representation of a CPN, places are denoted by ovals or circles, transitions are denoted by squares or rectangles, and lines with arrows denote arcs. If a predicate or tuple is written next to an arc, a token must satisfy the predicate or unify with the tuple before it may pass through the arc. Token colors are defined at the top of each CPN in terms of tuples of standard values, such as strings or integers (tokens may also be defined as data structures).
Places may be labeled with a particular color by an italicized label. CPNs have been applied to a variety of problem domains, including security, network protocols, mutual exclusion algorithms, VLSI chip designs, and chemical manufacturing systems [22] . Petri Nets have also been applied to the safety domain [29] , which is closely related to the security domain [38] , and to IDS systems [25, 26] .
CPNs provide a design upon which to base further development of our agent-based IDS. Our work with modeling intrusion detectors as CPNs has shown that CPNs provide a formal foundation for the agent-based distributed intrusion detection system and allow analysis of the intrusion detection system for discovering inconsistencies between components of the system, finding ideal places in the monitored system for security improvements, and proving that certain attacks can not be successful if a system is changed to remove or disallow vulnerabilities.
From SFTA to CPN Templates
Template Colored Petri Net intrusion detectors may be generated from Software Fault Trees for Intrusions to ensure correctness and correspondence between a requirements specification based on an SFTA and a design using CPNs.
The constraints added to an SFTA to describe the ordering relationships between nodes requires special handling to develop accurate CPN templates from SFTA.
Leaf nodes in the SFTA for intrusions correspond to basic events in the system which must be detected. Leaf nodes then correspond to token source places in the CPN. The token source places produce a new token each time the basic event takes place. Tokens generated by token source places must have sufficient descriptive information so that tokens may be matched and unified to satisfy any trust, context, and ordering constraints that exist in the SFTA.
AND nodes in the SFTA are of special interest in intrusion models. Semantically, when all child nodes of an AND node in a SFTA are true, the AND node is true. Tokens leaving the transition must be unified such that they satisfy any related trust and context constraints that exist higher in the SFTA. An examination of the trust and context constraints that are connected to branches along the path to the root in the minimum cut of the SFTA will identify the constraints for the events described by the incoming tokens. The designer must construct the unifying expressions so that the related elements in the output token(s) satisfy the constraints. For example, if a constraint exists in the minimum cut that requires two SFTA nodes to be related by a common TCP network connection context, the tokens must be unified using the elements of the TCP quadruple (source host, source port, destination host, and destination port) that uniquely identifies a TCP connection; this would satisfy the connection context constraint node in the SFTA.
AND Nodes without Ordering Constraints

AND Nodes with Ordering Constraints
Nodes connected to an AND node in an SFTA may have an attached constraint that requires the nodes to become true in some particular order. Two cases exist: first, nodes may be required to become true in order, but intervening events may occur; second, nodes may be required to become true in order with no intervening events.
To support ordering, CPN tokens are required to contain times or sequence numbers. If event occurs before event , the timestamp in the token representing event must be less than the timestamp in the token representing event , and no two events may have identical timestamps. Likewise, if event occurs before event , the sequence number in the token representing event must be less than the sequence number in the token representing event , and no two events may have identical sequence numbers.
Literal wall-clock times used for comparisons are a problem when the times are obtained from different computers in a distributed system [44] . Each computer has its own notion of the current time, and computer clocks tend to skew at different rates. We assume that the clocks are kept synchronized and the skew AE between a computer's clock and the actual time is very small. As an implementation detail, the intrusion detection system may itself synchronize the clocks and monitor the measured difference AE Ñ between clocks. The IDS may have an established maximum skew AE Å and may consider any AE Ñ AE Å to be an intrusion. In addition, the implementation may include AE in its comparisons between timestamps. The comparison Ø ½ · AE Ø ¾ AE yields a tight bound on two events, which may result in false negatives. The comparison Ø ½ AE Ø ¾ · AE yields a loose bound on two events, which may result in false positives.
For sequence numbers, sequence numbers are maintained per context. No comparison may be made between sequence numbers across contexts.
The addition of temporal ordering to SFTA and the associated representation of time information in event tokens enables temporal reasoning.
4.2.2.a Occurs After
The case "occurs after" covers the situation where SFTA nodes must become true in a particular order. Figure 1(b) shows an example of an AND node constrained such that node Ý must occur (become true) after node Ü becomes true, where and are defined as above in Section 4. Timestamps in the "occurs after" case may be either wall-clock time or sequence numbers.
4.2.2.b Immediately After
The case "occurs immediately after" covers the situation where SFTA nodes must become true in a particular order. Intervening events may not occur. In Figure 1 (c), × Õ½ and × Õ¾ denote the sequences numbers for events Ü and Ý, respectively. The related CPN segment shows that a token for event Ý must have the timestamp immediately following the timestamp for event Ü, implying that discrete timestamps (sequence numbers) are necessary for the operation of this CPN segment.
OR Nodes
When any of the child nodes of an OR node in a SFTA are true, the OR node is true.
An OR node in an SFTA corresponds to a transition and outgoing place pair in a CPN. An OR node with Ò inputs translates to Ò transitions, each having ½ incoming arc. Each incoming arc comes from either a token source place based on an SFTA leaf node, or the outgoing place based on an SFTA gate node. Figure 1(d) As with constraints on events in an AND node, tokens leaving the transition for an OR node must be unified such that they satisfy any trust and context constraints that exist higher in the SFTA.
Generation of Token Definitions
Defining token types in the conversion from SFTA to CPN is more difficult than generation of places and transition because this is a fundamental difference between SFTA and CPN. SFTAs describe what construct a hazard at a conceptual level and the event described in SFTA is not as detailed as in data level. But for CPNs, especially for CPNs that are used to generate a program, more details are needed to describe what constitutes an event. we may add an explanation in the representation of the SFTA like type="REPONSE", src_port="21", value="2xx".
Then for the token source place generated, we can specify enough information to describe the event in the token and enable further token matching and unification.
Automatic translation from SFT to CPN
Based on the specification of translating from SFT to CPN templates described above, a software fault tree can be translated to Colored Petri Net manually. But to automate the procedure of intrusion detection agent generation, an
Extensible Style Sheet Language (XSL) [1] based program is implemented to generate a Colored Petri Net from a
Software Fault Tree automatically. Then, together with the CPN to agent compiler described later, a new Intrusion Detection Agent can be automatically generated given a software fault tree for an intrusion.
XSL is used to design the translation program. Using XSL to do the translation has the following advantages:
First, using Extensible Markup Language (XML) [5] Fourth, it is efficient. The XSL translation program is very quick.
Design of automatic translation
To perform the automatic translation, an SFTA is first designed using a software fault tree tool. For this step, we use Visual XML Writer [12] to design the software fault tree. We also designed a Document Type Definition (DTD) for the software fault tree XML.
Then, we used XSL to translate SFT XML to CPN XML. This is done using an XSL transformer program, such as Visual XML Writer.
Third, view and validate the CPN that is translated from SFT using Design/CPN. During this step, optimization can be performed on the CPN to improve the efficiency of CPN.
Algorithms
Leaf nodes Leaf node in SFT is corresponding to token source places in CPN. Leaf nodes are classified in several classes, and one class is corresponding to one kind of event. Leaf nodes in same class generate tokens with same color.
The software fault tree is scanned to find out all the different classes of leaf node, one token place is generated for each class.
And nodes with constraint And nodes is corresponding to transitions in CPN. For each and node that is found from
SFT XML, a place, a transition, and condition for the transition is generated. One input arc and corresponding token string are generated for each input event to the "and node", and one output arc with corresponding token string is generated.
Tokens generation Tokens must include enough information for token matching and unification in the CPN. Attributes such as temporal information, source & destination address, and port information is normally included to describe an event on network.
Declaration file generation
The colors definition and variable declaration is needed for the Colored Petri Net. The colors used for the Color Petri Net are specified first; for example, IP_ENDS or IP_QUAD. Then the SFT is scanned to find all the variables that must be declared. Figure 3 is a CPN that is generated automatically from the SFTA of Figure 2 for the FTP Bounce Attack using the XSL technique.
Result
Translating CPNs to an Agent-Based Implementation
Similar to the algorithmic approach for creating CPN templates from SFTA, an algorithmic approach to creating an agent-based implementation from the CPN design is presented that generates code from CPNs. A developer creates an implementation by following the algorithm to write the code. The developed code contains places that hold tokens and transitions that match and unify tokens.
By using the translation algorithm to convert CPN designs to code, we can be certan that the code implements the CPN design. Also, if the translation algorithm preserves CPN semantics, any analysis performed on the CPN design also applies to the implementation. Finally, creating an implementation in code allows the developer to improve performance over the execution of a general CPN.
A distributed implementation of the CPN model using mobile agents can provide a reliable, robust, and efficient intrusion detection system [20, 31, 42] . Our implementation provides useful information to the security analyst in the form of a trail of transitions through which CPNs passed. [41] provides further details regarding the MAIDS implementation. Figure 3 : FTP Bounce Attack Penetration CPN generated automatically from SFTA via XSLThe MAIDS prototype uses the Voyager agent platform, version 3.2, from Objectspace [32] . An agent is an instance of a Java class, which may be created either locally or remotely. Additionally, Voyager supports code mobility of two types. One agent can move another agent between hosts, or an agent can request its own migration. The use of Voyager is not central to the MAIDS design. Other agent platforms that have been considered for use include Grasshopper [18] and SMART [45] .
Java-based Implementation Algorithm
The algorithm for translating a distributed CPN to an implementation in Java is as follows. Here for simplicity we maintain a one-to-one relation between CPN nodes and agents; an optimization strategy recognizing a distinction between agents and roles, as described in [10] , will be discussed in section 5.3. The CPN arcs, which constitute the structure of the agent network, are not maintained centrally. Each transition knows about the places to which it is immediately connected, and places know nothing about the agent network structure.
The algorithm preserves the CPN semantics in the implementation and allows for efficient execution. Performance can be increased over the execution of a general CPN by optimizing code segments to fit specific intrusion detection applications. For example, matching and unifying tokens is computationally intensive, at least Ç´Ò ¾ µ in the general case; but in cases where the number and types of tokens are known in advance, faster algorithms can be used. If a place holds tokens of a single type, an implementation could match tokens in Ç´Ò ÐÓ ¾ Òµ time based on a binary search or Ç´Òµ time based on hash tables. Such enhancements could be made to the Transition superclass so that they would not be a burden to the end user, but they are not part of the current MAIDS implementation.
Every agent must provide, strictly for debugging purposes, an agentName() method returning an identifying string. Beyond this, agents have specific requirements as follows.
Required methods for data place agents
The responsibility of a data place is to generate fresh tokens from whatever information is locally available. It must implement a work() method, taking no arguments and returning a TokenBag. This method will be called periodically from the DataPlace superclass code.
Required methods for transition agents
Transitions are much more complex, embodying as they do all of the logic of the agent network. But most of the complexity is hidden in superclass code. Three additional methods must be implemented: Of these, only the last is nontrivial to write. sources() should return an array of the labels of the places that have arcs to this source; tokenSpec() should return an array of token colors, and determines what kind of input the unify() method will see. For instance if tokenSpec() returns the array {"blue", "red"}, then whenever unify() is called it will be given an array containing one blue token and one red token, in that order. unify() is then responsible for deciding whether those tokens should be unified. If so, it returns a new array of tokens; otherwise it returns null. Notably, there is no explicit destinations() method. This information is placed in the tokens themselves via an argument to the Token constructor. In the case where the token is created by a data source place, there is no delivery, so the source place itself is given as a destination; in the case where a transition is creating a new token, the destination is determined by an outgoing arc on the CPN.
Behind the scenes, the Transition superclass is responsible for iterating through the tokens available from the places given in sources(), retrieving from there sets of tokens satisfying the description given in tokenSpec, and presenting them to the agent class as an argument to unify(). If it gets an array of tokens in return, it delivers them to their designated places and deletes the source tokens; otherwise it leaves the tokens where they were found.
Preservation of CPN semantics
The MAIDS representation of a CPN as a network of Java objects satisfies the CPN properties listed in Section 4.1, as follows: Each type is a color in set ¦, each instance of a Place is an element in set È, each instance of a Transition is an element in set Ì, arcs between places and transitions are encoded in the transitions (when proceeding from place to transition) and tokens (when proceeding from transition to place); they are finite in number and are distinct from places and transitions, the encoding of arcs as described above defines the node function AE, the assignment of color in the Token class constructor defines the color function , the unify() method implements the guard expressions in for each transition in Ì, the unify() method also implements the arc expression for each arc ¾ , and a trivial initialization function Á makes each place begin empty of tokens.
The implementation of transitions and places may impose additional constraints not present in the CPNs so as to obtain efficiencies for particular expected token colors; as long as only expected token colors exist in the places, the CPN semantics are satisfied by the implementation.
Algorithm For Translating CPN Design to Distributed Agent Implementation
The Multi-Agent Intrusion Detection System (MAIDS) uses a distributed agent-based system to detect intrusions. If the CPN model of intrusion detection is expanded to include multiple data source nodes (which are simply duplicated places that provide the same token colors to transitions), and transitions are given mobility, the result is a distributed CPN (DCPN). In our design, transitions are selected for mobility based on their need to visit different sites in the distributed system to collect tokens from duplicated place nodes for matching. The places visited by the transitions are defined dynamically through the user interface.
The previous section examined the implementation of a CPN as Java code. This section further details the implementation of a CPN as agents in a distributed system.
Node Categories
The IDS CPN design resembles a tree where data is obtained at the leaf nodes, fed up through the internal nodes, and finally reaches the root node when an intrusion is identified. Tokens in the IDS CPN represent information that, as tokens "rise" through the tree, is correlated with other information to identify intrusions.
Source places (places which have no incoming arcs) are considered leaf places. The transitions adjacent to leaf places are considered leaf transitions.
Sink places (places which have no outgoing arcs) are considered root places. The Alert place is currently the single root place in the CPN IDS design.
Internal places and internal transitions are the remaining places and transitions, respectively, in the CPN IDS design.
Leaf Places and Transitions
Raw audit data of various types and formats is obtained from monitored systems for the IDS. Data cleaning agents have been developed to read and process the raw audit data for use by the IDS. The data cleaning agents correspond to the leaf places and transitions in the CPN design.
Leaf places and transitions are duplicated at each monitored system to manage the constant process of data retrieval and cleaning.
The leaf places (data cleaners) are agents that remain in a single location to obtain raw data, such as that available from log files. In the current MAIDS implementation, the leaf places are instantiated separately on each host by the operator, where they will remain stationary for the duration of their activity. Future improvements to MAIDS would allow the console to dispatch the leaf nodes to the monitored host and allow the console to recall the agent to replace it with an updated agent or cease monitoring. The leaf places perform minimal processing and do not place a substantial resource load on the monitored systems.
Leaf places are an instance of places in the MAIDS DCPN implementation that require customized coding to perform operating-system specific data gathering and cleaning tasks. Nearly all other places are generic, passive containers of tokens.
Leaf transitions (data gatherers) are mobile agents that travel between monitored systems to obtain tokens. Currently, single instances of each leaf transition perform the data gathering duties, but in the future, multiple instances of each leaf transition could cooperate to gather data in a large distributed system. Informally, the leaf transitions perform the first level of data gathering and filtering in the IDS. Formally, the leaf transitions perform the token matching and unification specified by the CPN IDS design.
Internal Places and Transitions
Internal places act as passive containers for tokens. Internal places are not duplicated; a single instance exists and accepts tokens from all (possibly mobile) transitions connected to it. Internal places currently reside at the machine running the console, but they could be given mobility if it becomes advantageous.
Internal transitions are similar to leaf transitions in that they apply token matching and unification rules to tokens as they are obtained from incoming places and sent to outgoing places. Like internal places, internal transitions are statically positioned at the machine running the console. Internal transitions could be given mobility if advantages are found to such mobility.
Root Place
The root of the CPN IDS design is the alert place. It acts as a passive container, but when a token is added to the alert place, the IDS console interprets the token and displays it. Transitions are required to set an urgency level parameter in tokens for use by the IDS console. Tokens are sorted on the IDS console display by their urgency and then by their arrival time.
The IPlace Interface
The IPlace interface specifies four methods: All Place agents in the network, except the data source (leaf) places, are instances of final classes. As a result, the end implementer is never responsible for any of these methods. They are called by transition agents, but in superclass (Transition) code so that they are invisible to the implementer. Additionally, DataPlace superclass code uses storeToken(). The lock() and unlock() methods allow a transition to atomically examine and either replace or remove tokens from several places.
Testing CPNs and Implementation
A set of use cases (positive and negative examples of intrusions) were developed to test the intrusion detection system requirements. The CPN design was tested using the use cases to observe the behavior of the CPN and verify correct functionality. Equivalence classes may be used to test representative samples from groups of intrusions to reduce the testing effort [35] .
Since the requirements model is less detailed than the CPN and may not be as expressive as a CPN model, the CPN design further constrains the sets of events that will be identified as intrusions. Thus, some use cases that are identified by the requirements as intrusions will not be considered intrusions by the CPN model and the intrusion detection system implementation. Each use case must be annotated to describe whether the requirements and/or design will identify the use case as an intrusion.
Some ways of analyzing CPNs include:
1. Interactive simulation -Execute a CPN model in a way similar to interactively debugging a program. 
Testing FTP Bounce Detection
FTP bounce detection was tested using an expect script to launch the attack from an HP-UX host outside the local network. Because real intrusion data for this attack was not readily available in the form of network traces, we mixed normal and malicious sessions to simulate attack under significant network traffic conditions. An upload of a oneline text file followed by a download of the same file was our model of a "normal" session, and was chosen for its superficial similarity to an instance of an FTP bounce attack. The normal session scenario, like the attack scenario, was made repeatable using expect scripts. A Perl script invoked these expect scripts to run 50 ftp sessions sequentially; the sessions numbered 2 and 49 were malicious, and the rest were normal.
Two monitored Linux hosts were attacked, one as relay and the other as target. A third Linux machine served as the host console.
The relay host was running a modified version of the wu-ftp server. Changes were made to source code file ftpcmd.y to blindly enable PORT commands regardless of source or destination. While this very vulnerable server was active for testing, packet filtering was kept in place to discourage real attacks from outside our laboratory's domain. Also, the target host's RSH service was not made vulnerable; instead, RSH service was disabled and a proxy was set up to watch port 514 and echo its traffic to a terminal window. By these measures, all the essential events could appear as a real attack, but with minimal danger of our test systems being compromised.
When run in isolation, a scripted attack was detected typically between 2 and 5 seconds of its completion. This time disparity was to be expected because of the discrete actions of the agents and the randomized delays that were artificially inserted.
In tests of the 50-session ftp sequence, the two malicious sessions were reliably detected (i.e., no false negatives) with no false positives.
Related Models
Related graph based modeling techniques and implementations of intrusion detection systems, including GrIDS, MuSigs, and IDIOT, are briefly contrasted with our approach.
GrIDS
The Graph-Based Intrusion Detection System (GrIDS) dynamically builds graphs describing network activity by applying user-defined rules to audit data [43] . In GrIDS graphs, nodes represent hosts or aggregations of hosts and edges represent network activity. Rather than building a single graph including all system activity, individual graphs are maintained by rule sets. Each rule set matches certain events from the network audit trail and either builds a new graph or adjusts an existing graph. Rule sets may also combine graphs and raise alerts when suspicious patterns are discovered.
The motivating example given by the GrIDS designers is the graphical model of a worm such as the Morris Worm [11] . As the worm spreads through systems, a tree-shaped graph would be developed by GrIDS.
In the GrIDS approach, nodes model hosts and edges model activities. The model allows intuitive aggregation of nodes and edges into reduced graphs. Reduced graphs allow higher level analysis and data sharing, resulting in a scalable design.
GrIDS detects violations of security policy, and as such is inherently a misuse detection system. However, it should be possible to extend the graphical model to select objects and events to analyze for anomalies. Our CPN work does not limit itself to modeling communication patterns. Our modeling techniques apply to all events in the monitored system. Also, rather than directly using the graphical model, a mobile agent system intrusion detection system is developed using the CPN model as the design specification to improve performance and allow flexibility in implementation. Algorithms, data structures, and agent topologies can be chosen in the implementation such that performance is greater than if the CPN model itself was executed.
MuSigs
The Adaptable Real-time Misuse Detection system (ARMD) represents misuses as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) [30] . Abstract events are represented by nodes in a graph. Edges in a graph represent the ordering of inter-event rules satisfied by the nodes. Nodes are selected for the graph by intra-event rules. The inter-and intra-event rules together define misuse signatures (named MuSigs). If a graph is built such that a sink node has an edge to it, an intrusion is detected.
Unlike the object/event model used by GrIDS, MuSig graphs are not amenable to aggregation. Edges in a MuSig graph only mean a predicate has been satisfied; edges then have no values or attributes that can be aggregated. Nodes in a MuSig graph correspond to specific events; aggregation of events seems to be a difficult proposition in the absence of structured methods to aggregate the attributes associated with the events. Finally, MuSig graphs can not be used for anomaly detection since by definition a MuSig graph detects a misuse intrusion. Thus, the GrIDS-style object/event model seems more powerful for general misuse and anomaly intrusion modeling.
Our CPN models allow for aggregation through unification of tokens and also allows for anomaly detection. Our intrusion detection system is developed using the CPN for the design specification, so our IDS does not need to implement matching of graphs.
STAT
The STAT system [19] graphically represents intrusions as transitions in a state machine from a normal state to a compromise state. Each state in the state machine represents snapshots of the monitored system and is represented as a set of assertions about elements of the system. Each transition represents actions that move the system closer to the compromised state.
STAT can be considered a high-level specification and, in that respect, compares with our SFTA approach to modeling intrusions. A detailed STAT state machine could be used as a design for an IDS or executed as an IDS, and in this respect, corresponds to our CPNs and agents. However, the separate tools (SFTAs, CPNs, and agents) used for the different concerns (requirements, design, and implementation) in our approach provide a clearer distinction between the development activities than does an approach that uses state machines throughout the development lifecycle.
Additionally, SFTAs tend to be more understandable as a high-level specification than state machines.
IDIOT
Kumar and Spafford developed a variant of CPNs for misuse detection [26] , which they call patterns. Intrusion Detection In Our Time (IDIOT), Kumar's intrusion detection system, implemented CPNs with modifications including eliminating concurrency, removing local condition variables at transitions, adding start and final states, and adding invariant conditions to patterns [25] . IDIOT uses a custom language to describe patterns. To improve the computational complexity of direct execution of CPNs, various optimizations were used to reduce the computational effort involved in matching audit data to patterns.
Our CPN-based IDS is developed using the CPN as a design specification rather than a direct execution of a CPN to allow the implementer to improve performance. We define a transformation from the CPNs to the implementation of the software agent intrusion detection system that preserves the CPN semantics. Our IDS also operates in a distributed environment using an agent-based approach. Our CPNs are hierarchical and composable, and they model stages of attacks and are traceable to SFTA-based requirements.
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper details the procedure by which a distributed, agent-based IDS was implemented from a SFTA-based requirements and a CPN design. Intrusions are divided into temporal components which are modeled using SFTA.
Constraint nodes, specifying trust, temporal, and contextual relationships, are used to augment SFTA and restrict the combinations of events which define intrusions. Algorithmic approaches are used to create CPN templates from SFTA and agent implementations from CPN designs. The result is an intrusion detection system which detects the intrusions which were specified by the original requirements.
Dividing components of intrusions into temporal stages allows the development of CPNs that detect individual attacks 2 . Composition of the CPNs into a hierarchy models the correlation of individual attacks to detect complete intrusions. Future work may investigate how attacks may fit together into complete intrusions and determine how to further compose CPNs. For example, if detectors for single attacks are developed, data mining techniques such as frequent episodes [27] may discover groups of attacks that occur in combination. A detector for the group of attacks could be made by composing the individual attack detectors together.
Constraint nodes were added to enable SFTA to model temporal, contextual, and trust relationships between events.
Such information is necessary to distinguish actual intrusions from events that bear similarity to intrusions and improve the false-positive rate of the implemented system.
An algorithm is used to convert SFTA intrusion specifications into CPN intrusion detector design templates. This conserves the relational constraints of the SFTA and preserves the logic of the SFTA. Likewise, an algorithm is used to convert CPNs into agent implementation templates. The implementation preserves the properties of the CPN design while providing agents for use as a distributed intrusion detection system.
The SFTA constraints, SFTA to CPN template conversion algorithm, and implementation of the IDS using the CPN design act together to ensure that correctness is preserved from requirements to implementation. The requirements engineer must refine the initial SFTA by adding constraints to specify the temporal, contextual, and trust relationships between events that take place as part of intrusions. The designer must finish the CPN design by adding places to provide tokens to the CPN and refining the tokens so that they unify to satisfy the contextual constraints.
Our use of SFTA with trust, temporal, and contextual constraints to model intrusions for a requirements specification has assisted the development of CPNs for intrusion detection. The use of CPNs to model intrusion detection is not new. Likewise, agents have been used to create intrusion detection systems. Our requirements to implementation use of SFTA, CPNs, and agents intrusion detection structures the development of an intrusion detection system into a repeatable, verifiable process.
Agents in our prototype intrusion detection system function as CPN places and transitions. Places are generally static agents which either act as a source of information or hold information until a transition requests it. Transition agents are the active components which accept tokens from places, act on or unify the information in the tokens, and pass the resulting tokens to other places. Viewing MAIDS agents and data as an implementation of a Colored Petri
Net has conveniently generalized the system and enabled further development. Transition agents are given a set of places to visit by the user interface. In the future, it may be useful to give the transition agents the ability to self-direct their travels. Such capability in an agent could allow evasion of an attacker or faster reponse to important events.
We have implemented a prototype FTP bounce attack detector based on the CPNs detailed in this paper using agent technology based on the first MAIDS implementation. Thus far, we have concentrated mainly on the penetration phase of intrusions, but have also begun development of CPNs for other stages of intrusions.
Continuing and Future Work
An important and interesting issue is to investigate the length of time tokens should be kept in places. Performance of the IDS degrades siginificantly as meaningless tokens accumulate. The current policy is simple: an uncollected token expires after a fixed timeout. One possible extension is to allow a timeout to be specified in the Token constructor, making it possible to script delays into an attack to evade detection. This complicates the CPN model by adding work for the system designer (who would have to specify token lifetimes as part of the fault tree). Furthermore, the development of an algorithm for token garbage collection should be explored to address the underlying issue of token lifetime management.
The SFTA and CPNs presented in this paper model misuse intrusion detection. Ongoing work is investigating the application of these techniques to anomaly intrusion detection. One of our first steps has been to model rules learned by a data mining algorithm for anomaly intrusion detection with CPNs. In this case, rules learned by the RIPPER rule learning algorithm [8] that detect sendmail anomalies [17] were modeled. We have created an algorithm to transform the learned rules into a CPN. Further work is required to develop an SFTA that describes this data mining technique and other techniques for anomaly detection, and then leads to a CPN model of anomaly detection.
The MAIDS architecture described in this paper is being extended by our research group to develop techniques for automatic generation of agent classes from CPNs and to integrate MAIDS with existing IDS technologies, for example, Tripwire [24] and PortSentry [34] .
